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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Threats and Challenges to Maritime Autonomous
Surface Ships – Role of Law Enforcement Agencies

Degree:

Master of Science

MASS will be the future of shipping industry. Technology has proven that
machines and high tech systems can replace men presence onboard at sea, which is
considered a devastating development in the human race. MASS is also being widely
accepted in the world and has also proven itself as the future for sustainable shipping.
With this great advancement, shipping industry may also face bigger challenges related
to maritime security.
In maritime security the major threat includes, terrorism, piracy, cyber threats and
armed robbery. Considering all these, IMO has formulated many regulations for
implementation. The fear of transformation of ship into a weapon was always there.
However, with the arrival of MASS, this fear has increased and may also be a threat to
maritime security. Furthermore, the ultra-technological variations will have definite
consequences in the implementation scheme too. The notion of independent, unmanned
vessels upsets the complete maritime regulatory setup and interrupts the fundamental
ideas of law.
Based on these challenges and threats posed by MASS, this dissertation
deliberates upon the threats and challenges to MASS and role of law enforcement
agencies (LEA’s). The technological shift when crewless ships operate at sea will witness
higher security challenges. For this reason, there is a need of possible mitigation
measures to be investigated. On MASS and SCC, threat like cyber-attack and physical
attack are more as compared to other conventional ships. To overcome these threats,
shipping industry, manufacturers and LEA’s have to think, coordinate and develop global
strategy for the safety and security of MASS and SCC. There is also a need to impose
and implement regulations related to new emerging security risks by IMO. Port security
measures need to be enhanced and required to undertake risk assessment. Stringent
security measures must be taken against cyber and physical threats to MASS/SCC.
Subsequently, the dissertation deliberates upon the necessity for applicable solutions for
dealing and avoiding these two security threats.
Keywords: Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), Unmanned Ships,
Autonomous ships, Shore Control Centers (SCC), Maritime Security, Piracy, Cyberpiracy/attack, Maritime law enforcement.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1

Background
Shipping industry is the backbone of international economy and almost 90% of

the worldwide trade is being passed through international transport industry (UNCTAD,
2020). In 2011 Germany introduced the expression “Industry 4.0” which is recognized as
the fourth Industry technology/revolution. According to Imran and Kantola, Industry 4.0
revolution was introduced due to rapid growth of contemporary technologies, which
comprises of Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing, Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyperconnectivity, automation, big datas and analytic advanced, smart and hyper-connected
technologies (2018). In addition to this, it is highlighted that shipping industry has also
revolutionized itself in respect of new technology, digitalization and automation (ICS,
2021). Therefore, in shipping sector, Shipping 4.0 revolution/uprising has been known as
Autonomous Ships (AS) or Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) which are being
operated/handled from a Remote Control Centers (RCCs) also called Shore Control
Centers (SCCs) by an automatic program and decision-making systems (Emad et al,
2020; Sakhi et al, 2019).
1.2

Definitions of MASS
There are many definitions of MASS, in recent past many research institutes,

organizations and governments have conducted a number of researches on MASS.
MASS is however still is in the phase of research, development and testing. Therefore,
MASS has no official and defined definition. However, in many MASS studies, the
European Union Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence Networks (MUNIN)
project, DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), Lloyd's Register (LR), and China Classification
Society (CCS) provides MASS’s descriptive definition.
MASS is defined by CCS as:
“It refers to a vessel using different forms of communications, sensors,
IoTs and other ways for obtaining and perceiving information in an
automatic manner. It also uses technology and automation to gather data
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of various elements such as the marine environment, port and logistics.”
(CCS, 2015)
According to DNV, MASS is defined as:
“These vessels are based on self-governance as well as automation to
different extent.” (Rødseth & Nordahl, 2017)
MASS defined by IMO, as:
“A vessel that is capable to operate without human interaction to various
degrees.” (IMO, 2018)
According to MUNIN MASS is defined as:
“It is regarded as vessel possessing communication based technology and
control systems of next generation. This enables remote monitoring and
controlling as it has advanced support systems for effective decision
making and the ability to operate through full or partial autonomous control
” As shown in the figure 1. (Fraunhofer, 2015; Munin, 2019, p.3).
Figure 1

Generic
alternatives

Actual

Envisaged Ship Control Methods

Manned Ship

Radar
ECDIS
Visual
…..

Remote Ship

Radar
ECDIS
Visual
…..
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Symbiosis

Automatic Ship

Radar
ECDIS
Visual
…..

Autonomous
Ship

Radar
ECDIS
Visual
…..

Note. Adapted from “SWOT-AHP Analysis of Autonomous Shipping,” by Şenol, Y., Gokcek, V., & Seyhan,
A. 2017, Paper presented at the 4th International Multidisciplinary Congress of Eurasia Proceedings, p. 5869.

The project of MUNIN explains that, computers onboard ships have been
programed in such a way that sailing will be done automatically at high seas through
these computer systems. However, an operator who is on shore will control and monitor
the ship movement from Shore Control Center (SCC) (Rødseth et al, 2012), which is
shown in figure 2. Therefore, whenever the ship need intervention, it can be done through
communication with Vessel Tracking System (VTS) or with another unit which is
operating in that vicinity (MUNIN, 2016).
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Figure 2
MUNIN Network

Note. Adapted from “Research in maritime autonomous systems project results and technology potentials
(final brochure) & nbsp,” by Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Network MUNIN, 2016,
(http://www.unmannedship.org/munin/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/MUNIN-final-brochure.pdf).

Keeping in view the, above definitions and researches, MASS can be referred
ship with high tech sensors, automated digital navigation and auxiliary propulsion
systems, self-automated decision logics to follow plans, automated/digital environment
sensors, automatically adjustable mission execution considering the environmental
conditions and actually operate without human involvement.
1.3

Levels/Degrees of Autonomy
Globally there are various agencies/organizations who have discussed in detail

upon the different level of autonomy for autonomous ships. There are more than six
authorities have defined the categories for degrees of autonomy (Zhou et al, 2019).
According to Llyod, seven different levels of autonomy are there which is shown in
figure 3 (2016).
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Figure 3
Seven Levels of Autonomy

Note. Adapted from “Cyber-enabled ships Ship Right Procedure. LR defines 'autonomy levels' for ship design
and operation,” by Lloyd’s Register Group Services Limited, 2016, (https://www.lr.org/en/latest-news/lrdefines-autonomy-levels-for-ship-design-and-operation/).

The autonomy level which is suggested by Danish Maritime Authority is adopted
by IMO as shown in figure 3 (Zhou et al, 2021). There are four degrees of ship automation
identified by IMO in Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) as shown in figure 4 (IMO,
2018a).
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Figure 4
Degrees of Automation
MASS DEGREE 1

MASS DEGREE 2

MASS DEGREE 3

MASS DEGREE 4

Ship with
automated support
processes and
decision support
Seafarers onboard.
Some operations
automated & at
times
unsupervised with
seafarers ready to
control.

Remotely
controlled ship with
seafarers onboard

Remotely
controlled ship
without seafarers
onboard
Controlled
&
operated
from
other location.
No
seafarers
onboard.

Fully Autonomous
Ship

Controlled
&
operated
from
other location.
Seafarers available
onboard to take
control
and
operate.

The
operating
system of mass is
able
to
make
decisions
&
determine actions
by itself.

Note. Prepared from “Maritime Safety Committee 100th Session MSC 100/ WP.8,” by International Maritime
Organization, 2018a, Working group report in 100th session of IMO MSC for the RSE for the use of MASS.

At degree three and four i.e. at levels “RU” and “A” as shown in figure 5, there will
be no seafarer onboard ship.

Ships will be controlled from shore remotely/fully

autonomous with no human involvement (Klein, 2019; Şenol et al, 2017). Degree of
MASS autonomy is however not essentially linear or hierarchical. During any single
passage MASS can work more than one degrees of autonomy (Chae et al, 2020).
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Figure 5
MASS – Taxonomy of Autonomy Level
Unmanned Ship
Remotely Controlled Ship
Level M

Level R

Level RU

Level A

Manual
Navigation

Shore-Based
Remote
Control

Shore-Based
Remote
Control

Fully
Autonomous

With automated
process and
decision support

With seafarers
onboard

Without
seafarers
onboard

Note. Adapted from “A system-theoretic approach to safety and security co-analysis of autonomous ships,”
by Zhou, X., Liu, Z., Wang, F., & Wu, Z. 2021, Ocean Engineering, 222, 108569.

1.4

Progress/Timeline/Development in MASS
The concept of automation is not very old old. Since the advent of computer

technology, the self-steered autonomous robots are available and working all around in
every part of the world in different forms and ways. With the passage of time there have
been major improvements in the field of automation and technology, as a result smart
ships have caught the attention of maritime sector (Chae et al, 2020). The very first cargo
autonomous ship in the world is the Yara Birkeland, Norway (WMU, 2019). EU flagshipproject MUNIN are the first to conduct study on a crewless and autonomous merchant
ship, which led other companies and organizations to launch other concept ships in
Europe as shown in 1 (Rødseth et al., 2021; Wariishi, 2019).
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Table 1
European Initiatives in Development of Autonomous Ships
Projects with Industry- Government-Academia Collaboration
MUNIN
Maritime
 Implemented from 2012-2015.
Unmanned
 With the support of EU, the Fraunhofer Institute
Navigation
took the lead in developing the concept of
through
unmanned vessels and conducting pilot
Intelligence in
program.
Network
 Announced the effect of fueling efficiency by
10% or more and reducing the risk of collision
and sinking.
AAWA
Advance
 Implemented from 2015-2018.
Autonomous
 Lead by Rolls-Royce, with the support of
Waterborne
government of Finland.
Application
 Examined legal regulations and technical
Initiative
elements necessary for the realization of
autonomous ships, and conducted research
based on conceptual studies.
Efforts by Companies (primarily efforts towards practical applications)
Yara
Major

International Norwegian
fertilizers maker
Kongsberg
Maritime

division of a
Norwegian
public-private
enterprise
Rolls-Royce Now part of 
Commercial Kongsberg
Marines

Wartsila

Finnish marine
engine
manufacturer




Unmanned electronic container ship “Yara
Birkeland” scheduled to be put into service in
2022.
Development is supported by a subsidy from
the Norwegian government.

Under the SVAN (Saver Vessel with
Autonomous Navigation) project, demonstrated
autonomous operation of a freight and
passenger ferry (coastal ship).
Owned by Finland’s Finferries in December
2018.
Demonstrated autonomous operations of a
freight and passenger ferry (coastal ship).
Owned by Norway’s Noried in November 2018.

Note. Adapted from “Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships: Development Trends and Prospects-how
Digitalization Drives Changes in Maritime Industry,” by Mitsui & Co.Global Strategic Studies Institute, 2019.
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The conclusion on crewless and autonomous ships of the MUNIN project is that
they can only be used if they are safe and economical (Felski & Zwolak, 2020; Rødseth
et al, 2018). Initially, crewless MASS will be used only for transport activity at smaller
scale (Szelangiewicz & Żelazny, 2020). With the improvement in the technology and with
the development in the legal regulations/reforms, sea going autonomous ships will
emerge in fifteen to twenty years (Szelangiewicz & Żelazny, 2020). World leading
companies/organizations have assured and planned to bring crewless MASS by 2025
and by 2035 it is expected that fully automated MASS will be functioning in the oceans
as shown figure 6 (Emad et al., 2020; UNCTAD, 2018).
Figure 6
Autonomous Ship Future Development Timeline

Note. Adapted from “Shipping 4.0 and training seafarers for the future autonomous and unmanned ships,”
by Emad, G. R., Khabir, M., & Shahbakhsh, M. 2020, Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 21st Marine
Industries Conference (MIC2019), Qeshm Island, Iran, p. 1-2.

1.5

Threats and Challenges - MASS
According to Chang and colleagues, in shipping industry there are numerous

reasoning to squeeze MASS (2021). There are however issues with this new technology
such as the need to be recognized/adopted by the governments. In addition to this, the
outdated maritime industry has numerous valid issues of safety, security and reliability of
MASS operations (UNCTAD, 2018). According to Trump, with the technological
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advancement in the maritime sector, 4.0 ships still lacks in heftiness as well as rigidity
against various dangers which includes both cyber and physical attacks (2020).
In addition to this, at sea, hazards, like collision/grounding along with security
threats which includes piracy are always present. In this regard, Liwang stated that ship
characterize excessive financial and illustrative worth and hence be a target of acts like
robbery, piracy activity or terrorist attack (2016). Those who are involved in the maritime
sector/transport, security issue is a continuous alarm. Over the years, the maritime
stakeholders have strengthened the legal procedures and administrative instruments to
uphold the maximum security for ships, people working on ships and the cargo onboard
(Herbert-Burns et al, 2019). Nowadays, the biggest challenge for MASS is the threats
like terrorist attacks and cyber-pirates. Hence, MASS requires a strong communication
system with robust and multiple systems capable of dealing with these threats (Sakhi et
al, 2019).
1.6

IMO Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE)
Advancement in the field of technology and digitalization, maritime industry is also

continuously developing itself and testing these technologies to conduct safe
autonomous vessel operations. International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) has started a RSE in 2017 with the goal for identifying ways for
safe and secure MASS operations. Basically, this exercise includes two steps in which
the first step is to determine that MASS is safe and environmentally feasible within current
IMO conventions and future/upcoming goals. The second step is to analyse how MASS
operations can be addressed keeping in view the human, technology and operational
factors (IMO 2018). The first step has been completed by MSC at its 103rd session, as
high-priority issues were figured out with extended multiple instruments, and at policy
level these are required to be addressed in order to define future work. Further to address
MASS in IMO, there is a need to design a goal based instrument related to MASS in a
broader way through a regulatory framework (IMO, 2021). Therefore, the development
of goal-based instrument work has been commenced after the 105th session of MSC
meeting in April 2022. It was decided that, at the very first stage, a non-mandatory code
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will be developed and may be adopted during the second half of year 2024. After getting
experienced in the use of non-mandatory MASS Code, a mandatory MASS Code will be
shaped and will enter into force on 1st January 2028 (IMO, 2022).
1.7

Problem Statement
Considering the new advancement in technology especially in the field of

shipping, these conventional ships are prone to maritime threats. MASS is an emerging
technology, therefore there may be chances that Non-State Actors (NSAs), criminals/
terrorists could use the weakness of autonomous ships to carry out maritime crimes.
There is a dire need to review the threats and challenges to MASS which may impact the
maritime security. This is especially for threat of piracy in the form of cyber-attack which
may lead to any terrorist activity. Hence, it is important to pursue the most appropriate
measures to address this threat. In year 2021, maritime and logistics industry came
under cyber-attack many times which affected the shipping industry very badly. These
attacks targeted the ships with an increased frequency of 33% as compared to 2020
(Cyberstar, 2022). The top eight cyber-attacks of year 2021 which wedged the maritime
and logistics industry the most are highlighted in table 3.
Table 2
Cyber-Attack Incidents 2021
S.
No
1.

Incidents on
Date
Maritime
Companies
Two Attacks on Mar
Japan’s “K” line.
21
Jul 21

Remarks

 Hackers get into the company’s IT network
system.
 It contain around for ten days.
 The system then bring online in steps.
 Second attack was of interference called
“unauthorized access to overseas subsidiary
systems.”
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

 Hackers target HMM’s email servers.
 System remain offline for several days.
 Company was able to restore the system and
all the functionalities of the email system
within days.
 However it’s not that fast recovery as the
company is considered as a well-organized
and well reliance company.
Attack on Transnet Jul 21  Attack happened on a container terminal and
(Rail and port
many terminals were non-operational for
operator of a major
about a week including the main operational
South
African
systems which was completely disconnected.
logistics).
 In result many vessels neglect to enter port
and the terminal was stated force majeure.
Breach in a port of Aug
 Hackers subjugated a weakness in a
Houston, Taxes, 21
password manager, in order to crack the port’s
USA.
network system and subsequently get access
to other systems also.
 IT team immediately sensed the breach and
took necessary measures against the breach.
 No delicate data was collected with no
systems became upset.
CMA CGM, the Sep
 Hackers breached in company’s system and
French container 21
get the customer data.
shipping company
 There was only data leakage, no disturbance
observed in any main systems of the
company.
 The leaked data included sensitive information
(customer names and contact information).
Breach
on
a Nov
 There was an unauthorized access to the IT
Singapore based 21
systems and the breach was limited to the
shipping company
data exposure.
- Pacific Offshore.
 There was a loss of sensitive registered
commercial information and is considered a
serious breach.
Breach on a South Jun
Korean Shipping 21
Company HMM.
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7.

Attack
on
a Nov
consulting
firm 21
Danaos
Management
Consultants.

8.

Attack
Hellmann
Worldwide
Logistics,
Germany.

on Dec
21

 Hacker breach the IT network of the multiple
shipping companies.
 The breach was in the Supply chain.
 Many shipping companies do business with
the firm.
 10% of the customers were effected in that.
 Consider as a ransom attack which halt only
day to day operations.
 All the connections of the system were
removed from the central data center.
 This impact their business operations.

Note. Prepared from “How Bad Was Maritime Cyber Security in 2021? Consider These 8 Incidents,” by
Cyberstar, 2022, (https://www.zkcyberstar.com/2022/03/15/how-bad-was-maritime-cyber-security-in-2021consider-these-8incidents/#:~:text=On%20the%20cyber%20security%20front,and%20port%20systems%20in%202020).

These threats and challenges are being overcome through frequent patrolling,
deployments and conduct of maritime actions in different maritime zones by Law
Enforcement Agencies LEA’s, Navy, Maritime Security Agencies and Coast Guard (CG),
plus the Combined Maritime Forces (CTF-151 & CTF-150) and navigational rules
mentioned in the UNCLOS Article 11012 (Kraska, 2010). The piracy on any MASS might
lead to a terrorist activity. Hence, it is important to determine which actions will be taken
to counter that threat considering the state's right to engage based on its sovereign rights
over its maritime zones (Klein et al, 2020). There are numerous reasons for which
Combined Task Forces (CTF) commenced boarding operations on foreign-flagged
vessels under the umbrella of United Nations and same is the case with the LEA’s. Port
of Los Angeles (PoLA) developed an unmanned autonomous fast boat for the security of
the port which is capable of providing information of the target through its sensors above
water as well as under water (Galdorisi, 2022). MASS may create practical challenges
in the maritime domain for LEA’s. In order to maintain/preserve governance out at sea,
LEA’s are working on behalf of respective coastal states. Thus, the role of LEA’s in this
regard is considered very important.
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1.8

Research Questions
The research questions are as under:


What are the different security threats and challenges to MASS and its

impact on maritime security?


What is the role of law enforcement agencies in order to address the

security threats and challenges related to MASS?
The aim of this research is to highlight the security threats and challenges to
MASS which may cause damage to International organizations, ship building companies,
ship owners and Port/coastal states in respect of safety, environmental and economic
risk. Moreover, if these threats particularly cyber, piracy and terrorism activity will be
carried out on MASS/SCC, what will be the consequences and how they can be mitigated.
The objectives of the study is to identify different security threats and challenges to MASS
and its impacts on maritime security. Moreover, to make out the way forward to deal with
these security threats and challenges.
Based on the research questions and keeping in view the aim and objectives the
expected outcomes of the research is a better understanding of security threats and
challenges to MASS, to establish the role of LEA’s at sea, to familiarize states and
organizations w.r.t vulnerabilities of MASS, to deal with different security challenges to
MASS by the port/ coastal state in future, to develop effective strategies for safe and
secure maritime transportation (MASS) and to identify possible implications of MASS for
maritime security.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
2.1

Introduction
The United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is considered

all over the world as the “constitution for the ocean”, which institutes a lawful structure
that every country party to it must act, but this constitution doesn’t define maritime security
(Cook, 2020). In this regard, IMO is working hard to present higher safety and security
standards in the shipping industry. Maritime safety in this regard, is considered as a
major push back for businessmen to finance more in the field of MASS as it is considered
as the future and is also reinforced by the transformational technology (Komianos, 2018;
Kretschmann et al., 2017). However, to operate MASS as compared to commercial
ships, it will be very different because of the risk profiles, responsibilities and
accountability (Kim & Mallam, 2020). Keeping in this view, MASS will definitely change
the entire operational concepts of shipping with new emerging hazards, risks and security
issues. These issues may only be eliminated through new means and measures. It is
perceived that MASS may face higher boarding and robbery threat with regards to the
physical security (Honekamp, 2018). MASS as a crewless ship, creates a major security
gap and requires a risk mitigation strategy. Therefore, in future there will be security
teams deployed at pre-defined geographical areas/zones which may inspect and ensure
smooth sailing of MASS or entry/leave at ports (Komianos, 2018). Furthermore, there
will also be a risk of cyber threat to MASS in that, connectivity and cyber security is
identified as the likely gaps by RSE for MASS operations (IMO, 2021b). Hence to
enhance the understanding of MASS, the following sections explores advantages and
disadvantages of MASS, fundamentals of MASS, introduction to maritime security,
threats and challenges to MASS, role of law enforcement and cyber security/physical
incident (scenarios) identification.
2.2

Advantages and Dis-advantages of MASS
It is very important to know the advantages and disadvantages of MASS in order

to identify gaps and different threats and challenges to MASS. MASS may become a
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security threat to maritime sector while keeping in view the different dis-advantages of
MASS.
2.2.1

Advantages. MASS is considered as one of the future step towards

sustainability. Therefore many developers are investing in it and this concept is also
consider as a potential answer to many shipping issues (de Klerk et al., 2021). Around
75-96% marine incidents occurred at sea are caused by some form of human errors
(Rothblum, 2006). MASS will have reduced the number of navigation-related incidents,
like collision or grounding, as compared to the conventional ships (Wróbel et al., 2017).
Therefore, new technology and automation when applied on MASS degrees 1 and 2
(seafarer onboard) will definitely reduce these human related errors and marine incidents
like collision. However, it cannot be applied on MASS degree 3 and 4 (no seafarer
onboard) which will be operated from SCC. Therefore, there is a requirement to have
that type of technology which is capable of making decisions automatically in order to
avoid collision incidents and handle emergency situations (Chae et al., 2020).

In

situations like COVID-19 pandemic, MASS might reduce the probability of infection. It
upsurge the safety of aquatic life and increases fuel efficiency (Innovation, 2020).
Moreover, it will also support and reduce tiresome and risky maritime activities at sea
(Porathe et al., 2018). In addition, MUNIN forecasted that over a period of 25 years this
technology will save over $7m per MASS in terms of consumption of fuel, crew salaries
and supplies (Callum, 2018). It has also been learnt that there is a drastic decline in the
seafaring profession and people are not very much interested in this profession. There
are very selected/limited labour supplying countries which are providing man power for
this particular sector (Pribyl & Weigel, 2018). MASS while operating in a High Risk Area
(HRA) will definitely reduce the risk of piracy, hostage’s situation and cut short the
insurance coverage cost (Carey, 2017; Kobyliński, 2018). As per the report of State of
Maritime Piracy, total of 18 incidents were reported off the coast of West Africa and 21
incidents in Asia of kidnaping for ransom (EMERJ, 2022). Hull structure (closed structure
and streamlined exterior) of MASS also have potential impact on decrease of wind
resistance (aerodynamic profile) and prevent/stoppage of piracy for crew and cargo
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(Chae et al., 2020). Moreover, deckhouse would no longer be required (no crew and
bridge) and provide more space for cargo and easy to load the cargo (EMERJ, 2022).
2.2.2

Dis-advantages.

There are many risks and uncertainties which may also

come along with the benefits of MASS (Komianos, 2018). In case of new technology,
safety of navigation of autonomous navigation systems may increase complexities and
new hazards and unexpected system interdependencies (Utne et al., 2017; Chae et al.,
2020). Initially or at the primary phase of setup of SCC and building MASS, a huge
amount is required on capitalizing in the field of technology (Callum, 2018). MASS will
be controlled through SCC which is considered as the third dimension for controlling the
ship other than ship itself and ports. Handling MASS in harbor will be a challenging task
(Pribyl & Weigel, 2018).

In this regard, Van Hooydonk (2014) identified different

drawbacks of technology while consideting that the shore controllers inside SCC are
indulged in handling other ships along with assessing different situations at sea. Due of
lack of crew, maintenance of moving parts of MASS will be difficult on long voyages and
failures might cause significant delays (Callum, 2018). Cyber security is considered as
one of the biggest threat to MASS and is expected to be increased with the increase in
the mode/levels of autonomy (Kobyliński, 2018; Tam & Jones, 2018). According to
Kobylinski (2018) and Habdank (2019) there is a risk of hacking MASS by the hackers
(pirates) and taking complete control of ship. In result, hackers (pirates) will be able to
remotely maneuver the ship towards their desired destination and transfer all valuable
cargo. Pirates or so-called terrorists now a days may also use that ship as a bargaining
chip for their own interest like asking for money or make demands to free their men etc.
Furthermore, threaten coastal states by blocking port entrances, grounding, collusion,
transport contraband items and carryout any kind of terrorist activity at any military
installation/ assets. Table 3 below summarized these advantages and disadvantages.
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Table 3
Advantages and Dis-advantages of MASS
S. No
1.

2.

3.

Advantages

Dis-advantages

Curtailed number of navigationrelated incidents, like collision or
grounding (Wróbel et al., 2017).
Reduction in human related errors
therefore bringing down costs related
to accidents and insurance (Chae et
al., 2020).
Reduce tiresome and risky maritime
activities at sea (Porathe et al.,
2018).

Increase complexities, new hazards
and
unexpected
system
interdependencies (Utne et al., 2017).
Handling MASS in harbor will be a
challenging task (Pribyl & Weigel,
2018).

4.

Reduces the manning cost (Pribyl &
Weigel, 2018).

5.

Increase safety of life (Pribyl &
Weigel, 2018).

6.

Cut short the insurance coverage
cost (Carey, 2017; Kobyliński, 2018).

7.

Capable of operating in a High Risk
Area (HRA) will definitely reduce the
risk of piracy and hostage’s situation
(Carey, 2017; Kobyliński, 2018).
Hull structure of MASS have the
potential impact in reduction of wind
resistance and prevention of piracy
for crew and cargo (Chae et al.,
2020).
Environmental
free
operations/
voyages.

8.

9.

18

Shore operators inside SCC are
indulge in handling other ships along
with assessing different situations at
sea (Van Hooydonk, 2014).
Cyber security one of the biggest
threat to MASS and is expected to be
increased with the increase in the
levels of autonomy (Kobyliński, 2018;
Tam & Jones, 2018).
Cyber-pirates may hack MASS and
took complete control of ship
(Kobylinski, 2018 & Habdank, 2019).
Maintenance of moving parts will be
difficult on long voyages which cause
significant delay (Callum, 2018).
Initially huge amount of investment on
both SCC & MASS is required for the
development of the technology
(Callum, 2018).

10.

11.
12.

2.3

Situation like COVID-19, MASS
diminishing the likelihood of infection
(Innovation, 2020).
Upsurges the safety of aquatic life
(Innovation, 2020).
Increases fuel efficiency (Callum,
2018).
Background - Maritime Security
To make the maritime industry stronger, it is important to look into the matters

related to maritime security. Considering the above mentioned threats to MASS, they
may have direct influence, visible implications and effect on maritime sector. Since the
start of 1990s, maritime security is considered as an important aspect and remain focus
amongst many significant global security players (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). Coastal
states face many challenges like piracy activities, drug/human trafficking and
environmental crimes. These are not considered as threat to a particular state but to the
worldwide trade and energy security (Bueger et al., 2020). Presently, states’ emphasis
and the point of discussion at different levels is piracy, terrorism, arm/human trafficking
and illicit activities at sea (Bueger et al., 2020). The level of maritime security differs from
one area to another.

However, it is relatively easy for the developed countries to

implement global measures with an effective maritime administration.

Most of the

developing countries face issues/problems related to physical security of the ships, port
and surrounding areas of their coast because of lack of resources and funds (HerbertBurns et al., 2019). Considering all these ongoing challenges, the advent of MASS
technology in maritime sector will become a new challenge for the maritime nations and
will also raise question related to existing ocean governance structure (Klein, 2019).
2.4

Define - Maritime Security
As the research is basically focused on threats and challenges to MASS in

maritime domain, it is important to discuss maritime security in detail as the above
mentioned threats are very relevant to MASS as well. In that cyber threat is now become
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more prominent threat to MASS.

There are many definitions, meanings and

understandings of world “Security” and “Maritime Security”. According to Andritsos:
“It refers to set of actions or means for ensuring safety specifically against the
international threats. It also comprises of all the systems, measures or actions that have
the aim to present such threats so that they do not compromise
the security” (Andritsos, 2013).
“Maritime security also refers to different preventive measures which have the purpose
of protecting the port and shipping from the threats of unlawful acts which are
intentional” (Andritsos, 2013).
It is mentioned earlier that the word security and maritime security have different
connotations for different actors like military and shipping industry (Natalie Klein, 2011).
According to military point of view, US Navy operational concept explains that:
“It refers to ensuring of smooth flow of commerce, freedom to navigate and to protect
the different resources of ocean. It also focuses on ensuring that the maritime domain is
secured from different threats at national and international levels such as drug
trafficking, environmental destruction or illegal immigration
through sea” (Klein, 2011, p.8).
Ship owners on the other hand explain that:
“It is considered as a system of transportation along with relating to the safe logistics of
cargo without being subject to any form of criminal activity” (Klein, 2011).
Jones (2006) describes ship owner’s point of view and acknowledges the idea of maritime
security as:
“It is regarded as the state of vessel/port/crew in terms of being secured as well as the
safety from different threats such as piracy and terrorism.”
Keeping in view all the concepts and definitions of maritime security, it can be said
that there is no fixed definition for it and it is an eye catching word which mostly draw
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attention to upcoming threats and make provision for rule to address them. According to
Bueger (2015), maritime security is aiming towards ‘threats’ which prevails in the maritime
domain. In the new era of technology and digitalization, revolution in form of automation
and digitalization in the field of maritime industry has also evolved. MASS is considered
as an important revolution which is risk free and purely environment friendly (Emad et al.,
2020; Sakhi et al., 2019). It is considered that in future for sustainable shipping, MASS
is the future of shipping. The future is of technology and with the integration of Information
Technology (IT) and Operations Technology (OP), all the systems will combine into one
called Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). Through this one can operate and maneuver the
ship safely in future (Kavallieratos et al., 2020). MASS in future will be controlled from
shore based center called SCC as these ships will be crewless. Therefore, MASS along
with SCC and the present transport system (ships and ports) are considered as the main
actors which form a new structure for maritime security as shown in figure 7.

Figure 7
Block diagram of Maritime Security in the framework of MASS
MARITIME SECURITY
Shore Control Centers

Ship

Port
Physical & Cyber Threat

MASS

Threats to the Person Safety
(Passengers, workers, crew)

Threats to the Safety
of General Public

Threats to the public safety close to
port & coast

Disruption of Trade &
Mobility

Indirect threats to public safety
through smuggling

Note. Adapted from “EU port security & growth,” by Andritsos, F. 2013, Paper presented at the proceedings
of the 8th Future Security Research Conference, p. 267-274.
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2.5

Instruments for Maritime Security
Accidents related to maritime happened in the past, they happen today and will

also continue in future. Due to these accidents, the important elements which are most
effected are men’s life, material loss and environment. Once an accident occurs, the
worldwide communal attempts to make some more stringent rules and do legislation
changes or somewhat adopt new rules. In case of any security incident happened, it
aided and became as a grounding in the maritime industry for developing any security
instruments.

The current security measures of maritime sector are offered at the

international, regional, and national levels (Herbert-Burns et al., 2019; Metaparti, 2010).
The most important IMO instruments (figure 8) related to maritime security are explained
in the following paragraphs.
Figure 8
Maritime Security - IMO and global measures
SUA
Convention

Long Range Identification and
Tracking

Maritime Security
Maritime Transport
System

IMO

UNCLOS

Piracy and Armed Robbery

Guidance document adopted by IMO on:







SOLAS XI-2
& ISPS Code

 BMPs
 Regional Cooperation (RECAP,
Djibouti
Code
of
Conduct,
MOWCA, Code of conduct in West
and Central Africa)
 PCASP

Cyber Security
ISPS
Maritime Security & ISPS Code
Maritime Security & GISIS
Maritime Terrorism
Stowaway

Note. Prepared from “The International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code,” by International Maritime
Organization

2021a,

(https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-

2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx).
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2.5.1

Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention 1988 and 2005 SUA

Protocol
IMO

passed

one

resolution

A.584(14)17

trailed

by

circular

number

MSC/Circ.44318 in reaction to hijacking of an Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro in 1985.
A resolution 40/61 was then adopted by UNGA to “eliminate the issue of international
terrorism by taking quick and necessary actions at the national level, like synchronization
of domestic legislation with present international conventions and execution of presumed
international obligations”.

IMO adopted the convention called Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) in 1988
and was later revised in 2005 and finally implemented in form of Protocols to the SUA
treaties called as 2005 protocols (Attard, 2014; Cook, 2020).
2.5.2

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
In United States (US), 9/11 terrorist activity occurred which triggered a significant

change related to security and encouraged controlling authorities to examine shipping in
detail.

Hence, International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was

recommended and accepted in 2004. The main aim of this code was to protect shipping
from terrorists which may be used as weapons for mass distruction (Metaparti, 2010). In
order to augment maritime security, a new maritime security system was integrated in
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), chapter XI-2 on special methods, including the ISPS code.
Mandatory part is “Part A”, whereas guidelines are in “Part B”. The regulation in this
chapter says that ship security alert system must be installed on all sea going ships
(Komianos, 2018).
The main and important objective of this code is to ascertain security threats and
to adopt and enforce them and further make it mandatory for all the stake holders at a
national and international level (Dalaklis, 2017).

Therefore, to accomplish these

objective, there must be a Company Security Officer (CSO) along with Ship Security
Officer (SSO) onboard nominated by the ship operator. Furthermore, a ship must have
a Ship Security Plan and after having Ship Security Assessments (SSAs) it must get an
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) as well. This procedure is also required
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from ports to be complied. There are three phases for application of the ISPS code as
shown in figure 9 (Komianos, 2018; Progoulakis & Nikitakos, 2019).
Figure 9
ISPS Code Process Phase
Government and Industry Policies

Vessel Security

Security guidelines & policies

SSA

SSP

Set Security Levels

Security
Assessment

Security Plan

Establish Roles (CSO, SSO,
PFSO)

PFSP

PFSP

Facility Security
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Note. Prepared from “Risk Assessment Framework for the Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Assets,” by
Progoulakis, l. & Nikitakos, N. 2019, IAME 2019 conference.

According to many researchers it is recommended that, it is hard to apply the
present regulations related to security measures present in ISPS code on MASS,
therefore it must be amended to take into consideration the crewless autonomous ships
(Dalaklis, 2017; Kim & Yang, 2019). As MASS will be crewless, there will be no security
officer present onboard which is considered as a challenge for technical, institutional and
international organs and requires greater consideration to strengthen the security system
onboard such as vessels (Komianos, 2018). For this reason, there is a RSE being
conducted at IMO which concludes that all the high priority IMO instruments including
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 will be addressed on priority basis (IMO, 2021a). ISPS code defines
security occurrences, which mostly link to the ships. The ship’s security valuation would
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eventually calculate all probable threats, allowing to part “B” of ISPS code. The different
security incidents are shown in table 4 (IMO, 2021a).
Table 4
List of Security Incidents
S. No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Security Incidents
Damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility
Hijacking or seizure of the ship or persons on board
Tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or system or ship stores
Unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways
Smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction
Use of ship to carry those intending to cause a security incidents
Use of ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage to destruction
Attacks from seawards whilst at berth or at anchor
Attacks while at sea

Note. Prepared from “The International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code,” by International Maritime
Organization

2021a,

(https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-

2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx).

2.6

Maritime Security in non-IMO Treaties
On 10 December 1982, the 3rd UN conference on law of the sea was held in

Montego Bay, Jamaica which was basically based on maritime security counting the
desecration of territorial rights and piracy. In that, UNCLOS classified three significant
navigational rules which include “innocent passage applies in the territorial and
archipelagic waters, transit passage applies to straits used for international navigation,
and archipelagic sea lanes passage applies to archipelagic waters”. For economic and
security reasons, each of these rules attempts to pursuit a balance between two opposing
benefits of a coastal states, the second is the interest of states who struggle to keep
freedom of navigation and over flight. Part VII of UNCLOS particularly article 8820,
encompasses active requirements related to maritime security.

For every maritime

nation, maritime security is considered as common concern. Furthermore, article 100 of
UNCLOS provides the provisioning to fight with piracy, and allow cooperation among
states to clash with piracy activity at high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any particular
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state (Attard, 2014). In this regard, questions have been raised by Osinuga (2020) that
cyber-pirates may target MASS who are probably operating and are present on land and
therefore may not be reflected as pirates in a traditional way. He suggested that UNCLOS
may be re-looked in a manner that to cover, integrate and engage the piracy aspect in
respect of cyber pirates.
2.7

Threats and Challenges to MASS and SCC (Security Scenarios)
In future, MASS will likely alter the configuration, shape, and ways and means of

pirates, terrorist and criminal activities. With crewless vessels, keeping in mind the levels
of autonomy the number of hostage situations will likely reduce to minimum. However,
no person onboard may cause and increase in number of attempts to seize that ship for
valuable cargo.
Keeping in view all the traditional security threats to the conventional shipping,
with the advent of MASS there will be new emerging threat of cyber threat. MASS at sea
and SCCs on land are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Once MASS will be in the hands of
cyber-pirates, there may be various scenarios related to security incidents. Researcher
deliberate that once cyber and physical attack on SCCs/MASS happened, the expected
results/outcome are shown in table 5. In subsequent sections, a complete evaluation has
been carried out on Cyber Security threat in the background of MASS.
Table 5
Expected Situations – Cyber Attack
S.
Expected Situations after MASS and SCC will be Hijacked
No
1. Diversion to-wards vital military installation/ warships in the

ports

(Kobylinski, 2018)

2.
3.
4.
5.

Collision with vital cargo vessel (Habdank, 2019)
Grounding and blocking the channels (Chae et al., 2020)
Collision with oil tankers for environmental pollution (Chae et al., 2020)
Conduct of terrorist activity by exploding MASS in other’s country ports
(Kobylinski, 2018)

6.

Blocking the world trade routes (SLOCS) by grounding and collusions
(Chae et al., 2020)

7.

Use MASS as a bargaining chip to make deals to make their men free
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8. Make demands for money from shipping companies/ owners
9. Make SCC personal hostage and ask government to fulfill their demands
10. MASS itself use as a weapon of mass distraction
2.7.1

Cyber-Security Threats
With the advancement in the field of technology and development of autonomy

levels in MASS, cyber security has become threat to MASS and is also being the most
frequently asked question. It is a type of soft threat which is in hidden form (virus) where
the hackers are able to attain, access and get control of MASS system and change its
operation according to hackers’ objectives. This may cause severe consequences for
maritime transport industry. In recent past, IMO has addressed this cyber security
problem and issued guidelines on how to manage cyber risk (IMO, 2017b).

The

guidelines help in managing to protect ships from present developing threats. The
systems which are exposed to this threat and are highlighted in the guideline are shown
in the table 6:
Table 6
Systems Exposed to Cyber Threat
S. No

Systems

1.
2.

Bridge Systems
Cargo handling and management Systems

3.

Machinery and propulsion Systems

4.

Control Systems

5.

Passenger service and management Systems

6.

Passenger public network

7.

Crew Welfare Systems

8.

Communication Systems

Note. Prepared from “Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems Resolution MSC.
428 (98),” by International Maritime Organization (IMO), Maritime Safety Committee, 2017c.
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2.7.2

Physical Threat to SCC - Connectivity between MASS and SCC
In order to operate, MASS connectivity between SCC and MASS is essential and

can be called shore to ship connection. For that there must be a strong link of wire-less
communication either through satellite or UHF/VHF/HF transmissions.

These

communication links may be compromised which are used to maneuver and control
MASS from far distances through cyber-attacks (Tam & Jones, 2018). According to RSE,
cyber-security is also considered as a potential gap in MASS operations (IMO, 2021b).
Honekamp explains that communication and IT systems of MASS are the two main
security issues which need to be addressed and controlled, considering the cyber-attack
as a source of great concern (2018).
A study was conducted on use of robotics and AI by Kunz and Ó hÉigeartaigh,
which concluded that these things would affect the world safety and security sectors of
aviation, shipping, transportation and automobiles (2020).

It further explains that

development in the field of MASS will be the most robot related threat to the world. It
may be in the shape of transport of terrorists, drone carrying explosives, biological,
chemical and radio-active materials. The cyber-attack would not only affect MASS but
also SCC infrastructure. SCC play a significant role for MASS and is considered as the
hub of operation (Rylander & Man, 2016).

For navigators these centers will have

contemporary virtual bridge and machinery control rooms and these cyber-physical ships
will be operated by the virtual captains/ engineers. The only requirement to operate
MASS is of a secure and reliable connectivity and setup (Kutsuna et al., 2019). SCCs
will be installed with safe and secure communication system through terrestrial and
satellite, strong unbreakable link between sea/land-based actors, sensor related to
weather and sea, and presence of human to act as operator (Wróbel et al., 2020). In
RSE’s conclusion, gaps related to SCC has given high priority against many IMO
instruments. However, Chapter XI-2 to SOLAS has not included and considered them
as probable gaps for SCC (IMO, 2021b). SCC at one time can handle several MASS at
a time. Therefore, cyber-pirates or criminals may attack on SCC-MASS communication
or SCC itself to meet their agendas.
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2.8

Cyber-Security Incidents in Maritime Industry and Other Industries
There was a cyber-attack; called NotPetya which occurred in June 2017; on

Maersk’s system the world’s largest transport of seaborne freight. Global trade of 15 per
cent is transported through containers of this company. After the cyber-attack occurred,
the container ships of Maersk’s mounted motionless at sea and 76 port terminals around
the globe went on halt, port terminals working stopped. The retrieval of the entire system
was fast, however in that brief recovery period the organization suffered $300m losses
(Safety, 2018).

Similarly, in year 2022, there was another cyber-attack on JNCPT

container terminal in Mumbai in that hacker distract the container ship to other terminal
at the Jawaharlal Nehru Port using port Management Information System (MIS) near
Mumbai (Cyberstar, 2022).
Considering the above situations, the revealing gaps in MASS systems may also
become a favorable zone for cyber-attacks. Similarly, there are chances of cyber threat
when MASS is remotely operated and managed. If compared with driverless cars and
computer system controlled oil pipe lines, the consequences/impact of cyber-attacks
directing at MASS will be far more devastating and dangerous. Similarly, hacking of the
one of the giant maritime company of the world came under cyber-attack and its ship’s
and operations in port were halted which resulted in financial loss and diversion of
container ship in port of Mumbai from one terminal to another is a fruit for thought.
Consider an unmanned oil tanker hijacked by a non-state actors group/terrorist which
may be used to attack the buzziest port of a country.
2.9

Define – Cyber Risk
IMO defined Cyber risk as:

“Measuring the level of threat faced by a technological asset by any potential situation
that might lead to operational or safety/security related failures. This will be due to the
system or information being compromised, lost or corrupted” (IMO, 2017a).
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2.10

Communication System and Cyber Security of MASS
Safe, secure and proficient operations of MASS through wireless communication

systems is very crucial. Therefore, it is very essential to have a smooth and error free
communication link between MASS and SCC. The required communication system for
MASS are mentioned in the table 7. These communication needs to be bi-directional,
strongly encrypted, correct and sustained by various systems, without producing any
redundancy and diminishing the risk factor (Laurinen, 2016).
Table 7
Communication Systems used for MASS
S.
No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Communication Systems

Usage

Navigation Systems

Related to positioning and routesetting
Marine Satellite System
For information related to navigation
and safety between ships at sea and
Data Communication Stems
Remote monitoring and control infrastructure onshore (e.g. SCC,
Ports).
Systems
Satellite Communication System
Terrestrial Communication System

Note. Prepared from “The Next Steps; AAWA: Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications,” by
Laurinen, M, 2016, Remote and Autonomous Ships London, UK.

The above communication systems must be reliable, provide better performances
and must be secured and capable of dealing with cyber-attacks. In addition, issues
related to satellite or terrestrial communication systems need to be improved and tackled
in such a way that the system performance, cyber-security and system reliability must not
be compromised. MASS likely requires different types of sensors and systems like Light
Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), Radio Direction and Ranging (RADAR) , Global
Positioning System (GPS), Inertial Navigation System (INS), Global Maritime Distress
and Safety System (GDMSS), High Definition (HD) video, optical and Infra-Red (IR)
cameras, Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Automatic
Identification System (AIS), microphones, wind and pressure sensors. All above sensors
and systems will be controlled through SCC from shore and requires transmission of data

30

(both ways) to regulate MASS systems/functions and to make real-time decisions (Seif
et al, 2016).
In emergency situation, MASS should be remotely controlled from SCC through
the operator. All the important information/communication is done through satellite in a
short span of time. Therefore, high data transmission rate is required, including the data
reliability, smooth real-time communication, true authentication of the data transfer,
toughness, and security aspect must be the prime concern for effective communication
between MASS and SCC. Vis-à-vis cyber-security, if a cyber-attack occurs on MASS
main control system, it may become reason for causing an incident like grounding,
collision, and stationary at sea and environmental pollution (Chae et al, 2020). Figure 10
shows relationship between systems of MASS and SCC through satellite.
Figure 10
Relationship b/w MASS and SCC

Decision Support System
 Navigation system: GPS, INS
 Sensor module: RADAR, AIS,
LIDAR, IR camera, Sonar etc
 Automatic reporting
Operation System onboard
 Autonomous
operation
system
with
situational
awareness and self-diagnosis
function
 Smart
control
and
maintenance/
repair
with
robots for machinery and
equipment
 Onboard energy optimization
and monitoring systems

Data &
Decision
support

Monitoring
& control

Safety System
 Situational awareness
 Smart alarm & control system
for accident avoidance
 Safety support
Remote Control System
 Monitoring and control system
for
navigation
systems,
sensors,
machinery
and
equipment
 Remote support system
 Energy, fleet and revenue
optimization system

Note. Adapted from “A Study on Identification of Development Status of MASS Technologies and Directions
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of Improvement,” by Chae, C.-J., Kim, M., & Kim, H.-J. 2020, Applied Sciences, p.10(13), 4564,
(https://doi.org/10.3390/app10134564).

2.11

Law Enforcement at Sea
To maintain maritime security and law and order situation; out at sea within the

jurisdiction of any coast state; Maritime law enforcement is very important. Every coastal
state has its own maritime strategy to deal with maritime security. This strategy is derived
from government level and implemented at local level. LEA’s are the one who are
responsible to enforce government orders and at the same time prevent and suppress all
illegal activities out at sea. In that operations conducted are surveillance through air,
boarding operations, detail inspections, through search, persons arrest, seizure of
vessels, after detention of a ship imposition of sanctions (Galani & Evans, 2020). The
real gloom of MASS is an actual apprehension to the experts of maritime security. The
law enforcement community reflects that for criminals, MASS may become a strength or
a threat route to evade their detection of misusing this technology (Allen, 2018).
At high seas, article 110 of UNCLOS administer the Visit Board Search Seizure
(VBSS) operations which states that if there are realistic evidence of a vessel indulge in
piracy activity or any type of slavery trade and without nationality. As per the article
110(3) the LEA’s may “send a boat lead by an officer towards the doubted vessel” and
this boarding team can inspect and check the ships documents and if required may also
conduct the physical search in case of any doubt (Guilfoyle, 2017; Klein, 2019). Klein
(2019) judgmentally debates the case of doubtful MASS, where the condition to define
the MASS is a “ship” which is owned by a flag state and, if this is the case, that State’s
approval must be required for conduct of likely boarding operation.
contemplates it to be challenging (Klein, 2019).

However, she

Furthermore, states who ratified

UNCLOS are to cooperate with each other in order to overwhelm unlawful traffic involved
in narcotic, drugs and substances like psychotropic in the high seas. Drug convention of
1988 explained this cooperation for the purposes of law enforcement. As per the article
17 of drug convention, those vessels which are involved in any type of illicit trafficking the
right of visit be implemented by law enforcers on that particular vessel (Klein, 2019).
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2.12

Literature Review Summary
As MASS is the future of maritime sector, it is concluded that MASS has many

advantages like free of human error, better navigation safety, environment friendly,
capable of operating in a High Risk Area (HRA) with less risk of piracy and hostage’s
situation, reduce tiresome and risky maritime activities and fuel efficient. However, from
among the various disadvantages, cyber security and physical attack is the main threat
to MASS and SCC. Moreover, MASS along with SCC will form a new structure for
maritime security in that MASS at sea and SCCs on land both are considered as
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Furthermore, it is also established that, if the cyber-pirates
attacked MASS and SCC, there will be precarious outcome and depraved situations for
any flag/coastal state in general and LEA’s in particular and is considered to be unsafe
for the future of maritime industry. It can be determined that connectivity and cyber
security threat have a great effect on MASS which may lead to many dangerous situations
and may also cause implications on maritime security and increase the role of LEA’s.
However, precise statements cannot be accumulated since in the maritime field there is
no historical or accidental data available in the past. Therefore, researcher in next
chapter deliberate upon the methodology the impacts of MASS which is under Cyberattack on this aspect which is then analyzed in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
3.1

Introduction
In this chapter, researcher gives a framework of working methodology of the

research. In the following sections researcher tried to provide and explain in detail about
the methodology being used, the reasons for its selection, research approach being
followed, the entire process, data collection methods, ethical issues being faced, validity/
reliability and limitations faced.
3.2

Structure of the Study
This dissertation is divided into five different chapters where chapter one provides

the introduction to MASS, problem statement, aim, objectives, research questions, the
expected outcome and limitations faced during the research. Chapter two covers the
literature review focused on threats and challenges being faced to MASS and options to
address/cater these threats and the role of LEA’s. Chapter three covers the methodology
and briefly explains the approach, the questionnaires survey along with the given
scenario. Chapter four covers the findings and analyses of the scenario related to piracy
threat in form of cyber threat.

In chapter five there will be the conclusion and

recommendations.
3.3

Research Methodology
This research is related to the MASS and what are the different types of threats

and challenges faced by the MASS. As there is no historical data available w.r.t the
incident happened in the history, therefore the plan is to answer the already structured
research question through hypothetical scenarios. In response to the research questions,
quantitative approach will be used in which inputs from experts through surveys will be
used in addition to review of available research material. Figure 11 shows the procedure
being followed for the research to get the expected outcome:
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Figure 11
Process of Research Methodology (Author)

3.3.1

Explanation
Research is basically a complex activity to be carried out. It includes various

methods in order to achieve the aim and objectives of a particular research (Verschuren
et al., 2010).

In this research a quantitative approach is chosen, mentioning the

uniqueness of the research about threats and challenges to MASS and role of LEA’s.
The researcher practically used open-ended (quantitative) data collection method
(Creswell, 2021).
3.3.2

Reasoning
The choice of using and putting on the best techniques, irrespective of their

standards, in more multifarious conditions is a foremost advantage of a particular
approach.

Particular research topics permit examination/exploration by numerous

techniques extent through various models. Therefore, the selected approach are the one
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which probably provide and gives such liberty and flexibility (Kumar, 2018).

The

technology in the field of automation especially in maritime sector is evolving rapidly. Its
effects/impacts on various maritime disciplines are on a very early stages and is very
difficult to envisage.
3.3.3

Approach

The researcher has formulated two security scenarios related to MASS after going
through the literature review and validated/analyzed through surveys. It in opinioned that
survey is the option to get information from experts and relevant persons in the form of
anonymity in a very quick manner and without any expense. Moreover, because of the
non-availability of historical data on MASS (incidents) the formulation of two scenarios
and authentication are considered as a suitable tool for establishing the basis of threats
and challenges to MASS and role of LEA’s. Figure 12 explains the process of the
research by using two different scenarios creating methods that might be quantitative,
qualitative, or mixed approach (Star et al., 2016).
Figure 12
Research Process Methodology
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3.4

Research Process

3.4.1

Literature Review
Aim and objective of the literature review is to explore, discovery and identify the

threats and challenges to MASS and analyze the role of LEAS’s. Moreover to analyze
and examine the data gathered from the reviewed literature. The literature review
identifies certain weaknesses related to threats and challenges to MASS (maritime
security) and role of LEA’s. Security threats like cyber and physical attack are noticed in
the form of scenario and tested to address research objectives.
3.4.2

Survey - Questionnaire Form and Data Collection
Data collection through questionnaire surveys began on 26 July 2022 and was

completed on 10 Aug 2022. The questionnaire survey form has been formulated on the
basis of security threats (cyber and piracy) to achieve research objectives. The survey
form purpose is to make best use of the involvement of all maritime stakeholders. There
are two parts of the questionnaire. In section II, questions are made after the detail
literature review (Chapter 2) keeping in view the gaps while section-I contains total of
seven questions focused on the personal information of the participants. Moreover,
Section-II contains Twenty Three questions, including five questions fixated on
responders understanding with the MASS’s concept, maritime security, threats and
challenges to MASS and role of law enforcement, was acquired. Following questions
collected views/thoughts on cyber-attack and piracy attack and role of law enforcement
agencies linking MASS. The questionnaire survey template is placed in Appendix A.
To best capture the varied point of view of the participants, the replies were
assessed on a likert scale in a multiple-choice question format. For Section-I percentage
format was used starting form 0% to 100% for familiarization with MASS. Responses in
Section-II were scaled as 'Strongly disagree,' 'Disagree,' 'Neutral,' 'Agree,' and 'Strongly
agree'. Google form was used for electronic data gathering for participants ease. After
gathering the data from different maritime departments and experts, the data was
analyzed through SPSS (data analysis software). The survey questionnaire was also
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forwarded to different LEA’s. The consent form obtained from participants is at Appendix
B. Results of the survey are at Appendix E.
3.4.3

Scenario Validation
At present, time is categorized by improbability, revolution, and disorder change.

This stresses scenario upon planning techniques for their acknowledged efficacy,
uncertainty and compound situations. Scenario planning provokes reasoning, arguments,
planning and overwhelms the thinking process by creating multiple futures. In order to
overcome and to prepare of any upcoming eventuality by the organizations and
companies, scenarios are reflected as the best tool (Amer et al., 2013). It is also used
for the development of future strategies and problem solving.

Further, it critically

observes, identify and examines what is likely to happen in future with several
conclusions (Kim, Y. & Cha, 2012). The study utilized the scenarios related to threats to
MASS by examining/authenticating selected cyber security and piracy (physical)
attacks/incidents. Small description of the two formulated scenarios are explained in
ensuring paragraphs. Two hypothetical scenarios are at Appendix C.
3.4.3.1 Scenario-I (Cyber Attack)
In this scenario, it is envisaged that MASS/SCC came under cyber-attack by cyber
pirates/hackers. The cyber pirates take control of the MASS at sea and able to direct
MASS in any direction they desire. There are few situations highlighted in the scenarios
which may happen if MASS went under control of the cyber pirates. The questions asked
are what happens if that situations occurs and what will be the role of LEA’s.
3.4.3.2 Scenario-II (Physical Attack)
In this situation, it is envisaged that SCC which is on land came under physical
attack and a NSA group take control of the SCC and made the workers hostage. This
group made it possible and utilize the same workers to maneuver the MASS in the
direction where they desire. There are few situations highlighted in the scenario which
may happen after SCC went under physical control of the NSA group and what will be
the role of LEA’s.
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3.5

Ethical Issues
This study demanded the presence of a human element. Keeping in mind the

concerns of 'ethical issues' throughout the researcher data collecting process. The
survey questionnaire had to be approved after a detailed valuation to certify that it fulfil
the utmost ethical standards. Before any act concerning human action/involvement was
undertaken, the WMU Ethics Committee assessed all the sections of the survey
questionnaire.

In addition, the participant’s rights and privacy will be preserved.

Moreover, factors like confidentiality, secrecy, data security, and the flexibility to withdraw
from participation by the participants were closely followed. Furthermore, participation is
on voluntary basis, there will be no fee to be charged. There will be no addition or deletion
of data once it will be submitted by the participants. The entire data will be kept under
secured password and after final submission of the research the entire data will be
deleted. WMU Research Ethnic Committee protocol is at Appendix D.
3.6

Brief Summary of the Chapter
To achieve the research objectives of the research, this chapter delivers a

synopsis of the research methodology being used. To study the research questions
researcher involved and used a quantitative approach. The process includes the making
of security scenarios related to cyber and piracy threat based on literature review, which
was followed by authentication of scenarios through survey questionnaire to learn the
threats and challenges to MASS and role of LEA’s.
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Chapter 4 – Analysis
4.1

Introduction
In this chapter, statistical findings are presented of data gathered using survey

and the analyses of the research questions.
4.2

Survey Questionnaire

The survey commenced on 26th of July and was completed on 10th of Aug 22. A
total of 61 respondents participated in the survey out of which 56 were male (91.8%) and
5 were female (8.2%) (Figure 13) from 16 different countries of the world (figure 14). The
respondents belong to different parts of the maritime sector (8 from maritime
administration, 7 were maritime experts, 3 belonged to maritime academia, 6 were
seafarers and 3 form other professions) including the representatives of LEA’s (34 from
Navy/Coast Guard/MSA) as shown in figure 15.
Figure 13
Gender of Participants
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Figure 14
Participants Nationality
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Figure 15
Participant’s Profession
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It is important to mention that all the responders had a vast experience in their
respective fields and were able to share their experience and comment on threats and
challenges to MASS and the role of LEA’s. The figure 16 shows that 34.43% of the
respondents have over 20 years of experience and 31.15% respondents have an
experience of 16-20 years. Whereas 18.03% have 11-15 years, 14.75% have 5-10 and
1.64% have less than five year experience. This concludes that the responders have a
vast maritime experience.
Figure 16
Responder’s Experience
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Mostly the respondents are at the level of senior officer (27.87%), middle
managers (24.87%), junior officers (11.48%), professors/researchers (9.84%), masters
(9.84%), deck officers (4.92%) and top managers (4.92%) as shown in figure 17. This
shows that the data gathered is from vast variety of people operating at different levels in
maritime fields.
Figure 17
Participants Positions of Working
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Furthermore, it was also important to know the knowledge of the participant’s on
the four areas which the author has mentioned in the survey. These are the concept of
MASS, concept of maritime security and its importance, threats and challenges to MASS
and the concept of law enforcement at sea for analysis so that correct and accurate
findings could be extracted. Majority of the participants were familiar with the concept of
MASS, concept of maritime security, threats and challenges to MASS and the concept of
law enforcement at sea except one out of 61 as shown in figure 8. Finally, total of 60
participant were considered for evaluation and only one was excluded.

A detailed

outcome/

placed

result

of

the

survey

form

in

graphical

display

is

Appendix D.
Table 8
Participants – Percentage (%) of Familiarization with the Topic
Questions

Outcome in the form of Percentage

Are you familiar with the
concept of MASS

Are you familiar with
Maritime Security and its
importance in maritime
sector
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at

Are you familiar with the
threats and challenges
MASS may face in future
like:
a. Cyber Threat.
b. Hijacking or seizure
of the ship.
c. Piracy activity.
d. Use of ship to
conduct
security
incident.
e. Use of ship itself as
a weapon or means
to cause damage or
destruction.
f. Smuggling
weapons
or
equipment,
including weapons
of
mass
destructions.
Are you familiar with the
concept
of
law
enforcement at sea by
Coast Guard, Navy,
Police, Maritime Security
Agency’s

4.3

Threats and Challenges to MASS and Role of LEA’s Using Scenarios
Before analyzing the threats and challenges to MASS, it is pertinent to mention

that after getting the responses and once compared with the literature review, majority of
the respondents as shown in the figure 18 were of the same view that the most prominent
threat prone to MASS in future will be the cyber threat and piracy threat. Therefore it is
obvious that cyber and piracy/hijacking threats (65.57%) are the two top must threats
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which will effect MASS. Moreover, it must be kept into consideration by the manufactures
and the law enforcement agencies. They need close coordination to make and establish
a robust and strong communication network along with system in order to deal with these
type of threats.
Figure 18
Threat Most Prone to MASS

To discuss in detail the cyber and physical threat to MASS/SCC and the role of
LEA’s, two scenarios have been made and the criteria is discussed in para 2.7 and 3.4.2,
and further mentioned in table 10. These two scenarios are purely based on researcher’s
assumption for discussion which were then analyzed explicitly using the headings of
vulnerability of technology and mitigation measures.
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4.3.1

Scenario – I (Analysis)
The scenario relates to cyber-attack by hacker on SCC/MASS and is at Appendix

C. Cyber-attacks will increase in future and will be the top most threat to MASS as
compared to other threats. In response to SQ7 as shown in figure 19, majority of the
respondents (83.61%) agreed/strongly agreed that cyber-attack will be more on MASS
including cyber piracy in future.
Figure 19
Cyber-Attacks More on MASS Including Cyber Piracy
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In response to SQ6 as shown in figure 20, majority of the respondents (65.57%)
agreed/strongly agreed that traditional piracy attacks will affect MASS even when there
will be no crew onboard.
Figure 20
Traditional Piracy Attacks Affect MASS
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In response to SQ8 as shown in figure 21, majority of the respondents (77.05%)
agreed/strongly agreed upon that hijacking will be done because of the ransom, cargo
and stealing a ship.
Figure 21
Pirates/ Hackers Ask for Money
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In response to SQ13 as shown in figure 22, majority of the respondents (77.05%)
agreed/strongly agreed that there are high possibilities of MASS being hijacked and used
by criminals/hijackers for different types of international crime.
Figure 22
High Possibilities of MASS Hijacking - Used for International Organized Crimes
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Therefore, Cyber threat is considered more as compared to physical attack on
MASS. In response to SQ11 as shown in figure 23 majority of the responders (75.41%)
agreed/strongly agreed upon what is stated above.
Figure 23
Cyber Security Threat Considered Higher than Physical Attack
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Furthermore, crewless MASS may also be directed to drive into commercial
shipping at sea and in harbors. In response to SQ11 as shown in figure 24, majority of
the respondents (67.21%) agreed/strongly agreed that the possibility of collusion with
other commercial ships at sea and harbor is more and cyber-attack is considered as a
major threat by the majority of the respondents (82.4%) to MASS as shown in figure 1.
Figure 24
Crewless MASS Pose Threat to the Security of Other Conventional Ships
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In response to SQ9 as shown in figure 25, majority of the responders (72.13%)
agreed/strongly agreed that there is a possibility of exploitation of GNSS and AIS data of
MASS.
Figure 25
Possibility of Exploitation of GNSS, AIS Data Along with Digital Systems of MASS
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4.3.2

Scenario – II (Analysis)
This scenario relates to intrusion/physical-attack by a NSA’s group on SCC which

is operating/monitoring a number of MASS simultaneously is present at Appendix C. In
response to SQ15 (figure 26), majority of respondents (78.68%) agreed/strongly agreed
that the communication and network infrastructure of SCC/MASS is more vulnerable to
cyber-risks.
Figure 26
SCC More Vulnerable to Cyber-Attacks - Communication & Networking Infrastructure of
MASS
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In response to SQ16 as shown in figure 27, majority of the respondents (80.32%)
agreed/strongly agreed that SCC came under attack by NSA’s and used MASS as a
weapon against any sensitive targets (sensitive installation along the coast, warships and
commercial ships carrying vital cargo, oil racks in the oceans).
Figure 27
SCC Came Under Attack by the NSA’s - MASS Used as a Weapon, against Sensitive
Targets
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In response to SQ8 as shown in figure 28, majority of the respondents (77.05%)
agreed/strongly agreed upon the same results as shown above regarding the hackers
and NSA’s.
Figure 28
Pirates/ Hackers Ask for Money, Attacks on Vulnerable Assets or Port Installations,
Collision, Grounding
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In response to SQ10 as shown in figure 29, majority of the respondents (73.77%)
agreed/strongly agreed upon and are of the same view which is highlighted and
discussed above.
Figure 29
NSA’s Use MASS as a Weapon to Attack Sensitive Installations of any Country

58

In response to SQ17 as shown in figure 30, around 27.51% are disagreeing and
24.59% are neutral whereas half of them (45.90%) are agreeing to what is discussed
above. Therefore, it is revealed that LEA’s has the capability to deal only physical attacks
not the cyber-attacks.
Figure 30
Capability of LEA’s - Once Physical & Cyber-Attack Done on MASS/SCC
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4.3.3

Role of Law Enforcement Agencies (Analysis)
In response to SQ18 as shown in figure 31, majority of the respondents (81.96%)

agreed/strongly agreed that the employment of MASS will present new challenges for
LEA’s. Therefore, it is highlighted that MASS is also a new challenge for LEA’s as well
and to deal with this they have to prepare themselves better.
Figure 31
Employment of MASS, Present New Challenges for LEA’s
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In response to SQ20 as shown in figure 32, majority of the respondents (82.1%)
agreed that there must be some alternate means and arrangements for LEA’s to verify
MASS documents and conduct inspection.
Figure 32
Inspection of MASS, Document Verification Requires Alternate Measures
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It is very obvious that after MASS came in operation, the design feature is such
that it is very difficult for anyone to get access of MASS once at seas especially the
pirates. It also becomes a great challenge for LEA’s . In response to SQ21 as shown in
figure 33, majority of the respondents (78.69%) agreed that VBSS operations may cause
a challenge for LEA’s.
Figure 33
VBSS Operation Onboard Crewless MASS Cause Challenge for LEA’s
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Keeping in view the challenges of MASS being faced by the LEA’s, there must be
a requirement for possible change of maritime interdiction/boarding procedures in which
MASS is involved.

In response to SQ22 as shown in figure 34, majority of the

respondents (73.77%) agreed that there is a requirement to change in maritime
interdiction operations.
Figure 34
Requirement to Change Boarding (VBSS) Procedures Involving MASS
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In response to SQ23 as shown in figure 35, majority of the respondents (68.81%)
agreed that enhancement of maritime security in MASS era is unavoidable.
Figure 35
Enhancement of Maritime Security
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Chapter 5 – Discussion Recommendations and Limitations
5.1

Introduction
In this chapter, researcher will discuss in detail the threats and challenges to

MASS and role of LEA’s based on the analysis presented in the previous chapter.
Thereafter, some recommendations will be put forward for dealing with cyber and
physical threats. In the end some parameters of the study will be presented.
5.2

Discussion (Scenario – I)
If we talk about the cyber piracy, one of the threat includes hijacking of a ship at

sea (piracy attack) and MASS itself can also become a maritime security threat as
mentioned in figure 20. This threat to MASS may cause devastating consequences in
the minds of the peoples’ perception (Fan et al., 2020). This hijacking will remain like a
traditional piracy attack for some financial advantages or some political agenda but as
discussed it will be a multi-mode attack of initially cyber followed by a physical attack.
According to some experts, piracy includes two types of offences, first is hijacking
(for ransom, cargo onboard, stealing of a ship) and second is kidnapping which includes
threatening of crew until some ransom has been paid to the pirates as shown in figure 21
(Tumbarska, 2018).
In level of autonomy 1 and 2, the kidnapping as well as hijacking may be done
whereas in level of autonomy 3 and 4 only act of hijacking may be possible. However, it
is possible only when the cyber-attack is done initially. MASS will be technologically very
advance and will entirely dependent on communication network, AI and satellite link
which will definitely bring some new risks for MASS. AI may become security weakness
for MASS during its operations (Heikkilä, 2018). The gaining of access to control system
of MASS by hackers is a vulnerability due to which it is considered as a main
disadvantage of MASS (Li & Fung, 2019). As per the maritime decision-makers, there
must be some reason for pirates to board ship like cargo onboard, ship itself and may
use as a weapon for a mass destruction. In case of Southeast Asian pirates, their main
cause of hijacking a ship is for cargo in that the crew suffer injuries (Jiang & Lu, 2020).
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As highlighted above in case of level of autonomy 3 and 4, there will be no crew onboard
and it may be considered as a soft target for the hijackers to steal cargo or take control
of the MASS. Hence, there is a threat that MASS will be in the hands of the pirates who
may conduct terrorist activity. There is also a possibility that MASS may be used to
conduct international organized crimes or collide with an oil rig as shown in figure 22
(Eriksson & Gevriye, 2018).
The possibility of physical attack on MASS is lower as compared with the cyberattack because MASS is entirely dependent on IT, satellite and ICT systems on land
(SCC) and at sea (MASS) as shown in figure 23. Taken into account the three security
aspects people, processes and technology, technology is considered as a weak link
along all elements of security. As technology is advancing day by day, there are many
loopholes for interference especially in ICT of MASS. Moreover, the design feature (hull
structure) of MASS will be in such a way that it will be very difficult to get access on MASS
by the pirates, it’s like a free board (Chae et al., 2020). Further, it also restricts the entry
of unauthorized personnel on MASS.
There are many incidents reported worldwide as shown in the table 9. There are
still possibilities that modern pirates may also alter their techniques with the change and
advancement of the technology. If in any situation, pirates are able to physically get into
the MASS, there will be no accommodation except control room and engine room. To
get access of the control room great degree of knowledge will be required. An IT expert
with an ultimate hacking capability is considered very less possibility that all these
capabilities are present in ordinary pirate. Moreover, in autonomy level 1 and 2 it is
possible but it is not possible in autonomy level 3 and 4.
Table 9
Incidents Reported in Year 2020
S. No

Incidents in year 2020

Quantity

Remarks

1.

Piracy and armed robbery Incidents

195

Higher than the year 2019

2.

Hijacking of the ships/vessels

03

-

66

3.

Attempted attacks by the pirates

20

-

4.

Boarding done by the pirates

161

-

Note. Prepared from “Shipping and new technologies,” by International Chamber of Shipping. 2021,
(https://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-fact/shipping-and-new-technologies/).

There are examples of physical as well as cyber-attacks on commercial ships as
shown in table 10. Terrorist/hackers might use MASS as a weapon against countries
that have a strategic and economic importance (Suez & Panama Canals) or where they
consider that the risk of environmental disaster is high. There is an example on 23 March
2021 when container vessel “Ever Given” stuck in the Suez Canal. As a result, one of the
busiest shipping trade route of the world was blocked for 6 days and resulted in economic
loss as more than 100 ships were waiting on both ends on the canal (NY Times, 2022).
Table 10
Incidents of Physical and Cyber-Attack in Year 2021
S. No
1.

2.

Incident

Year

Explanation

Hijacking of August 2021
Panama
flagged vessel
Asphalt
Princess.

Reported in Gulf of Oman (GoO) by the United
Kingdom
Maritime
Trade
Operations
(UKMTO). The vessel was boarded by
heavily armed men, but the crews prompt
action in disabling the engine prevented the
incident.
Cyber-attack
August 2021 On the same day of the above reported
on 5-6 Oil
incident, in the same region reported
tankers
problems with their navigation equipment of
the oil tankers which led to the speculation of
a possible cyber-attack on vessels in area.

Note. Prepared from “SBS Boarding Team Detains Stowaways After Confrontation Aboard Tanker,” by
Maritime

Executive.

2020,

(https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/sbs-boarding-team-detains-

stowaways-after-confrontation-aboard-tanker).

Aforesaid discussion in view, it may be said that cyber-security or threats of cyberpiracy as compared to physical attack is more likely and practical as shown in figure 24.
Cyber-attacks take advantage of communication network weaknesses, which may
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endanger the reliability or accessibility of data and MASS regulatory systems (Bolbot et
al., 2019). MASS is exposed to cyber-attacks, and the threat is not related to MASS itself
or its cargo, but it may be a threat to the sensitive installation/infrastructure along the
coast and offshore if MASS is hacked. Consider MASS is approaching these sensitive
installations with high speed and lead to collision which result in a serious damage and
disaster. This will be true even if it is a small tonnage of MASS as it will also damage
those installations. A cyber-attack is compared with a terrorist activity/attack conducted
on USS Cole (Guided Missile Destroyer) of the US Navy. A small fiber glass boat hit with
the warship full of explosive along with two suicide bombers (Vinnem & Utne, 2018).
For cyber security, appropriate technology is present nowadays, the only point is
system should be properly designed and consequently accurate crypto solutions are to
be used by the manufacturers. There is another side related to MASS communication
which is of jamming and spoofing and can possibly be used by NSA’s/criminals against
MASS (Akpan et al, 2022). Jamming is consider as a significant concern other than
cyber-security, which is manageable through appropriate AI software’s which can
pinpoint signal irregularities. However, spoofing may confuse AI to commence unwanted
evasive maneuverers. It is also pertinent to mention that, when one AIS transmission
has been hacked, 50% of the job is done related to controls of the MASS, which is not
easy to fix quickly and requires time as well as money (Eriksson & Gevriye, 2018).
Further, GNSS system will also be jammed or spoofed as shown in figure 25.
5.2.1

Mitigation Measures (Scenario - I)
Against pirates, MASS is considered as an effective solution, Hull structure

(design feature) of MASS is the major proponent (Chae et al., 2020). It is always easy to
recapture an unmanned MASS. In case of any emergency, SCC can play its role and
take appropriate measures and especially get necessary assistance from LEA’s.
However, it would be difficult to stop a MASS which is hijacked because its operations
and controls are in the hands of the hackers.
Hull structure/design feature is the key factor of preventing MASS from elements
like pirates (Chae et al., 2020). If these elements try to hijack MASS, design may be like
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free board that they should not succeed in getting inside MASS or if it happened there
must be some heat sensors motion detectors and cameras (internal and external)
installed by the shipping companies at the access points along with the places like main
control system and engine control system. This will ensure that SCC may come to know
that some unauthorized entry has happened or about to happen on MASS so that
necessary actions are taken by SCC and if required also coordinate with LEA’s.
Better coordination with local authorities, cooperation with different states and
keeping LEA’s in loop may bring MASS safer against these type of threats. Coastal states
have responsibility to make themselves technologically strong and attain such capability
to control MASS for safe operations (BIMCO et al, 2018).
MASS should also avoid passing through HRA’s and as per Best Maintenance
Practices (BMP’s), it should adopt security protection measures and physical barriers like
Razor wire (barbed tape) and use of non-leather weapons (BIMCO et al, 2018).
Cyber security must be maintained during cyber-attack responses and prevention
plans centered on vulnerability identification. The implementation of high standards is
necessary for both MASS and SCC in order to deter any type of threat.
To avoid hacker’s attack, IT staff along with security experts must plan and
conduct regular incident checks and drills in order to identify weaknesses and bring
improvement in the security program of the ship (Li & Fung, 2019).
There should also be a continuous risk assessment as mitigation measure
depending upon an identified risk.

Follow/implement cyber security guideline

promulgated by IMO (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.1 – Guidelines on maritime cyber security
assessment (IMO, 2017d), MSC.1/Circ.1639 – Guidelines on cyber security onboard
ships, ISO/ IEC 27001 – Standard on Information Technology) and recommendations
(IACS recommendations on cyber resilience (Rec.166)) on cyber security.
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5.3

Discussion (Scenario – II)
In case of vulnerability to the technology in the degree of autonomy 3 and 4,

MASS control is shifted to SCC where the operator is capable of handling and operating
several MASS simultaneously. Through ICT, MASS establish link with SCC through
satellite which may also open an opportunity for hackers to access the main system
practically and exploit it. There are possibilities of cyber as well as physical attack on
SCC. All the participants of the survey showed a great concern about the security of
SCC. The first concern is the cyber threat to SCC. In the field of communication sector,
5G is a new jump and illegally it’s very difficult to get access, same is the case with the
SCC. However, still cyber-attack being well known and prone threat could possibly make
SCC its target as shown in figure 26.
The second concern is that NSA’s group can attack on SCC and get control of the
MASS through communication network. There is definitely a possibility that SCC may
also come under physical attack/intrusion due to which its security is paramount as shown
in figure 27.
In addition to this, the issue raised by SMEs in one of the qualitative study by
Roberts and colleagues stated that hackers hijack the network system of SCC and direct
MASS at a place where attackers can board MASS very easily (2019). Hence, stealing
of MASS through physical attack may appear less helpful in the scenarios (Carey, 2017).
The security threats for SCC tend to vary based on the state of security of the country. In
case of a developed country, the security state will be good due to which the threat to
SCC will be low and vice versa. However, in both cases if SCC is vulnerable to physical
attacks, maritime security is considered incomplete. Hence, if the control of SCC went
into the hands of NSA’s group, they might lead MASS to a safe place in the ocean for
different purposes. These include embarking terrorist to enter the port or conducting
terrorist activity, to bang into a warship/commercial ship inside port or at sea, conduct
grounding near port entrances/inside Channels, blocking international shipping routes,
carryout environmental pollution and demand for ransom as shown in figure 28.
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Furthermore, if we talk about the sensitive installations of any particular country
which includes sensitive installation along the coast of strategic in nature, warships and
commercial ships carrying vital cargo, oil racks in the oceans. The NSA’s may also be
used and derived by some other country to achieve their political agendas and use MASS
against sensitive installations as shown in figure 29.
Once SCC comes under cyber and physical attack, is there any possibility to deal
with this situation by LEA’S? In case of physical attack, yes there is a role of LEA’s and
has the capability to counter physical attack done by the NSA’s group and further bring
SCC in its normal working state through those operators who are already working in SCC.
However, LEAS’s don’t have the capability to counter the cyber-attack and resume SCC
in its normal working condition as shown in figure 30.
5.3.1

Mitigation measures (Scenario - II)
Communication link system between MASS and SCC is considered crucial for

MASS’s safe and proficient operation. Therefore, this system needs to be bidirectional,
vigorous, correct, and capable of reinforcing with different systems, without making any
redundancy and reducing the interference of third party (Chae et al., 2020). Present era
is the era of technology, where cyber-security is considered as an important
proponent/tool to deal with different types of cyber-attacks.

In order to deter and

neutralize the cyber threats, it is very important to implement high standards of measures
for MASS/SCC.

Hackers try to attack the main system in case of SCC/MASS.

Communication link is the loophole where hacker try to interfere. Therefore it is important
to give stress on this aspect in order to prevent these type of attacks (Akpan et al, 2022).
Furthermore, it is important to conduct training of personnel who are working
inside SCC as operators and technicians, carry out practical drills, conduct the audits and
do valuation of all the vulnerabilities to come up with good solutions (Akpan et al, 2022).
There is an example of 9/11 attacks, in that US government implemented strong security
measures for the protection of ports and maritime transport in form of ISPS and Container
Security Initiatives (CSI) after the terrorist activity was done through commercial aircraft.
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Therefore it is necessary for those states having high security environment to develop
proactive security measures for SCC.
There must be some contingencies for SCC and they need to be well defined.
There can be an overriding option available in other SCC to shift control immediately in
their hands. This option is not only in case of cyber-attack it can also be helpful to deal
some other emergencies.

Therefore, they must have strong and well protected

passwords, communication and links in encrypted form and security cleared personal
inside SCC.
Manufacturers also have a very important role in the security of SCC as they are
the SMEs of that system which is installed in SCC and its security is paramount.
Therefore, they must make and build such strong Information Communication Systems
(ICS) and networks which cannot become victim of any cyber-attack. Furthermore, strict
measures should be enforced and strong powerful programs should be installed which
are able to deal with cyber threats. In case of physical security of SCC, barriers are to be
placed, deployment of security guards, security cameras and protected walls/ fences/
barriers around SCC.
Based on above discussion, it is concluded that SCC is an important and high risk
place/asset which requires physical and cyber security. For maritime sector, IMO is the
only platform which can play an important role especially for the security of SCC. All
SCC’s must comply with the IMO present security standards and in future it is suggested
that IMO must regulate more robust standards for SCC to establish uniform policies which
are to be implemented by every coastal states. Furthermore, in RSE outcome SCC is
taken as the top priority issue as far as revision of the IMO instruments are concern (IMO,
2021). Though, SOLAS chapter XI-2 was not came under consideration as likely theme.
We can say that, SCCs will affect the maritime security arena in days to come,
and all the SCC’s should be secured against cyber threat and physical attacks. A single
center (SCC) which is hijacked can aid hackers to control many MASS simultaneously
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and probably be used as per the wish of the hackers. IMO have an important role in
safeguarding high standards for these centers.
5.4

Role of Law Enforcement Agencies
The employment of MASS is considered a major challenge for coastal states and

law enforcement agencies. Threats to MASS which are discussed above somehow have
to be neutralized and in that the role of LEA’s is very important as shown in figure 31. It
is considered that if the coastal state's law enforcement is less in number or scarce,
occurrences like piracy, hijacking and physical attacks will continue to occur. However,
if the number of patrolling timings increases; increase of accessibility at longer distances
and

provisioning

of

advance

technology

to

LEA’s;

the

chances

of

these

incidents/situations might be relatively low.
Van Hooydonk (2014) and Wrobel (2017) have explained the problems of
technology in relation to situational awareness and consistent working of technical
components. Nevertheless port security along with other procedures, the security of
MASS/SCC is totally controlled and managed through technological means. Therefore,
MASS/SCC vulnerability and security situation in that particular area decides the figures
and severity of incidents happened on MASS/SCC.
MASS is expected to uphold the maximum ISPS code requirements. There are
limitations of both technology and automation. Moreover, most of the ISPS complied
ports are aided with surveillance arrangements to detect any type of unwanted presence
or unauthorized personal in the port areas. Furthermore, physical security should also be
used and integrated with these electronic surveillance systems. Resultantly, there must
not be any situation occurred to attack physically on SCC by any NSA’s group.
In case of inspection of MASS during VBSS at sea, it will be difficult for LEA’s to
check the documents and verify them. In level of autonomy 1 and 2, it is possible as there
will be crew onboard however in level of autonomy 3 and 4, it is not possible. Therefore
there is a dire need to take up this issue at an appropriate level and come up with
solutions as shown in figure 32.
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5.5

Recommendations

Based on above analysis and discussion, following recommendations are suggested:


Global strategy is required to be developed in order to facilitate MASS
operations. In this regard, all regulatory bodies, member states along with
element of LEA’s and MASS manufacturers should sit together to find
potential gaps in making MASS operations more secure and strong
enough to deal with man-made threats.



Manufacturers before constructing MASS must consult and keep in mind
the viewpoint of LEA’s to prevent any type of security incident. In situation
where risk is kept as low as possible, stringent access control measures,
active surveillance techniques, cyber security solutions of high grade are
to be used and are to be frequently upgraded.



Port security measures need to be enhanced and those ports which are in
a planning phase of operating MASS should undertake risk assessment
first.



Impose and implement regulations related to new emerging security risks
to MASS by IMO to gain trust of maritime transport industry.



Stringent security measures must be taken against both cyber and
physical threats to SCC as it emerges as the hub of MASS operations.

5.6

Limitations
There were many limitations which were faced during the research. Firstly, it is

important to inform that the concept of MASS is in the evolving phase and most of the
people were unaware of this concept. Secondly, there is no historical data available
online related to the incidents of MASS or case studies. Therefore, to overcome the first
issue, researcher had to develop two scenarios for the ease of the respondents. The
response of participants was totally based upon their own perception, professional
attitude and one-side knowledge of their field. However, the two scenarios definitely
helped them in understanding MASS and filling the survey form with good knowledge.
Thirdly, due to nature of the topic and less knowledge about MASS, participation level
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was affected. Lastly, many of the experts haven’t replied to the emails and obtaining
physical access was very difficult. Nevertheless, this research will add great value in the
areas as mentioned above.

Further, the limitations should be overcome through

additional research in the future.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
6.1

Conclusion
During the research, researcher has done quantitative analysis based on the

survey form to answer the two research questions. The conclusion of research questions
(RQs) after carrying out detailed analysis and data processing is as under:
RQ-1: What are the different security threats and challenges to MASS in different
maritime zones and its impact on maritime security?
The outcome of the research shows that there will be two major threats to MASS
which are Cyber-attacks and physical attacks (hijacking, piracy and control of SCC). They
will pose a distinct impact on maritime security in future. The conventional piracy activity
may face downfall because of the new design feature of MASS along with the limited
expertise of traditional pirates in the field of technology with less bargaining ability to
protect monetary gains. However, this shouldn’t be entirely anticipated. The risk of cyber
and piracy cannot be ruled out or be entirely diminished. There may be more efforts by
pirates to physically board unmanned MASS (Level 3 and 4) or NSA’s group physically
attacking SCC. Above all, cyber-attacks attempts by hackers occur on both MASS and
SCC in a much larger quantity which become a major risk for the maritime security. To
avoid severe consequences of above said threats in future, MASS/SCC are to be
effectively managed and maritime authorities should focus on finding some solid
solutions.
NSA’s group on land may explore different options by hiring terrorists and
employing technical persons (hackers) to attack SCC/MASS physically. Through cyberattack, international trade will be disrupted as it will be a multi-mode attack (cyber followed
by physical attack). Criminals may also practice jamming techniques to interrupt GNSS
and AIS signals which may require a detailed consideration. Furthermore to confuse
MASS, cyber-attackers may also use spoofing technique. Therefore, AI systems must
be technologically advanced so that they can identify/detect such anomalies immediately
and take remedial actions and generate responses. SCCs are considered as the main
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hub for MASS operations and is a soft as well as vulnerable target for both NSA’s groups
and hackers. Hence, it requires special attention to protect against physical and cyberattacks. In case of any infiltration in SCC, infiltrator will have the entire control of MASS.
The communication system (Satellite) between MASS/SCC can also be targeted through
hackers. In addition, human element may be transformed/shifted from ship to shore
which still impact the security aspects of maritime sector.
Notwithstanding with all the concerns, there are a lot of possibilities and chances
of improvement in the field of maritime security as MASS is considered as complex and
costly system. Therefore, investment should be done by only serious owners and
operators who are more concerned about the security aspect.
Mitigation strategy along with the impact of MASS on maritime security should be
addressed. This will be done through coordination of highest level and cooperation
among those stakeholders which are involved in this field especially the flag states,
coastal states, SCCs, the ship owners, manufacturers, operators, the port facilities and
LEAs. In order to evaluate the security aspect, there is a dire need to understand what
kind of remote control crafts are being operated at sea and a uniform coordinated
methodology is to be adopted.
Overall, the wide range of onsite security measures include motion detectors, heat
sensors, camera and alarms. The difficulty in accessibility of MASS would definitely turn
as mitigation measures to notice pirates and prevent from any infiltration physically. To
prevent from cyber-attacks, different measures include strong password protected
systems, safe and secure communication, capability of dealing any cyber-attack, train
operators, conduct of cyber drills and regularly upgrade the network systems. In the
above said measures, the role of manufactures along with the SCC staff especially
operator is very important.

Moreover, the responsibility shifts from seafarers to

authorities on shore. Therefore, an effective, efficient and prompt maritime security and
law enforcement by port authorities, coastal states and LEA’s is required to avert
incidents onboard MASS.
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RQ-2: What is the role of law enforcement authorities in order to address the security
threats and challenges related to MASS?
The analysis revealed that the role of LEA’s must be enhanced to ensure security
of MASS especially in coastal waters as well as open seas and to deal with operations of
MASS’s implications on maritime security. It is expected that MASS will lead some new
challenges for the coastal states, port authorities, and LEA’s in order to manage maritime
security inside their operational regions. In future, there are chances in shifting of
responsibilities where the role of SCC’s operators would also become limited due to bad
situational awareness.

Therefore, substantial necessity may exist in upgrading the

technological capability onboard law enforcement platforms (ships), to cooperate and
handle or in some situations control MASS. VBSS operations in future may also be
affected, and become difficult to undertake on MASS. This will be due to access restraints
and no crew onboard.

However, in some circumstances and situations, desired

requirements need to be fulfilled. This will occur when MASS is being used against
sensitive installations, collusion with warships/commercial ships, blocking of port
entrances and conduct of terrorist activity by exploding MASS inside port, and an illicit
activity for which there is a need of making procedures and protocols.

Bilateral

agreements must be done with those coastal states which are also employing MASS.
Therefore, for smooth conduct of operations and handling of bad situations, there is a
dire need for agencies to uphold great level of cooperation and coordination with
numerous stakeholders like manufacturers, coastal state, flag state, port authorities and
operators.
For future and days to come, research struggles may be focused towards a
specific scenario (cyber or physical). Security risk assessment of SCC and MASS may
be done using requisite tools as both of these have a meaningfully effect on security of
maritime domain. The other important point is responsibilities plan and procedures
related to deal such incidents (manufacturer, flag state, coastal state, LEA’s).
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Appendix C
Scenario – 1 (Cyber Attack)
Situation.
Shore Control Center (SCC) which is established on land is
operating/monitoring several Autonomous Ships which are operating at sea. This SCC
is considered as the heart of (command center) the ship’s operations. SCC is capable of
communicating, controlling and maneuvering ship movement, building the situational
awareness and planning the routes of the MASS. Everything is being controlled through
Information Communication Technology (ICT). This SCC is under cyber-attack by an
unknown hacker and the entire control is now in the hands of that hacker.
Development in the Situation.
Once the hacker gets the control of the SCC without
physical interference only through cyber-attack due to which he is in a position to
maneuver and control the MASS operations. It’s now his choice where to divert that
MASS. We must also consider that, the hacker is a professional hacker and he may have
some demands like money/ransom or some other political agenda from the government
or from the flag state.
Outcome.
Following may be envisaged:
a.
The hacker directs MASS toward vital military installation/ships in the port.
b.
The hacker directs MASS towards vital cargo vessel for collision.
c.
The hacker directs MASS towards grounding and blocking the channels.
d.
The hacker directs MASS towards oil carrier for environmental pollution.
e.
The hacker directs MASS towards the critical points/areas like
(Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, Suez canal etc.) of the world trade routes and
block that points/ areas by grounding and collision.
f.
The hacker directs MASS towards the other country port and explode that
vessel.
g.
The hacker uses MASS as a bargaining chip and ask for ransom.
h.
The hacker uses MASS itself as a weapon of mass destruction.
Role. Here comes the role of under mentioned organs:
a.
b.
c.

Flag State
Manufacturer
Law Enforcement Agencies

• Cyber-Attack
on
SCC
• SCC control in the
hands
of
the
hacker

• Collision
• Grounding in Key
navigable area
• Militry installations
• Blocking of world
trade routes
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• Environmental
disaster
• loss of lives and
property
• Disruption of good
order and peace at
sea

Scenario – 2 (Physical Attack)
Situation.
According to IMO’s degree/levels of automation (IMO, 2018) in which at
level 3 and 4 there will be no men onboard MASS. It will be controlled from Shore Control
Center (SCC) which is established on land. SCC is responsible to control and monitor
several Autonomous Ships which are being operating at sea. This SCC is considered as
the heart of the ship’s operations. SCC is capable of communicating, controlling and
maneuvering ship movement along with observing situation of the sea and planning the
routes of the ship. SCC being the central hub, its security is paramount. Therefore, a
banned non-state actor group plans and undertakes invasion of the SCC to attack any
military installations in the area, government installation on shore, blocking the port
entrances and carryout collision incident with other commercial ships at sea. This SCC
came under attack physically.
Development in the Situation.
Upon taking physical control of the SCC and
making the personnel hostage. The entire ship control is in the hands of those non state
actor’s/group. This group use the same personnel to maneuver MASS in the direction
where they want. As these personal are hostages and they are force to obey the
instructions of that group.
Outcome.
Following may be envisaged:
a.
The group directs MASS toward vital military installation/ships in the port.
b.
The group directs MASS towards vital cargo vessel for collision.
c.
The group directs MASS towards grounding and blocking the channel.
d.
The group directs MASS towards oil carrier for environmental pollution.
e.
The group directs MASS towards the critical points/areas like (Malacca
Strait, Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal etc.) of the world trade and block that points/
areas by grounding and collision.
f.
The group directs MASS towards the other country’s port and explodes
that vessel.
g.
The group uses that MASS as a bargaining chip to free their men or for
ransom.
h.
The group uses MASS itself as a weapon of mass destruction.
Role. Here comes the role of under mentioned organs:
a.
b.
c.

Flag State
Manufacturer
Law Enforcement Agencies

92

• Physical-Attack on
SCC
• SCC control in the
hands of the NSA's

• Collision
• Grounding in Key
navigable area
• Militry installations
• Blocking of world
trade routes
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• Environmental
disaster
• loss of lives and
property
• Disruption of good
order and peace at
sea

Appendix D
WMU Research Ethics Committee Protocol
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Appendix E
Section I and II Survey Questionnaire Results
Question
Number

Questions

Results
General Information (Section – I)

1.

No of personnel
participated

2.

Nationality

3.

Gender

4.

Age
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5.

Job

6.

Position

7.

Experience

Section - II
SQ1.

Are you familiar
with the concept
of
Maritime
Autonomous
Surface
Ship
(MASS)
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SQ2.

Are you familiar
with
Maritime
Security and its
importance
in
maritime sector

SQ3.

Are you familiar
with the threats
and challenges
MASS may face
in future like:
a. Cyber
Threat.
b. Hijacking or
seizure of
the ship.
c. Piracy
activity.
d. Use of ship
to conduct
security
incident.
e. Use of ship
itself as a
weapon or
means to
cause
damage or
destruction.
f. Smuggling
weapons or
equipment,
including
weapons of
mass

97

SQ4.

SQ5.

destruction
s.
Are you familiar
with the concept
of
law
enforcement at
sea by Coast
Guard,
Navy,
Police, Maritime
Security
Agency’s
What do you
think
which
threat is more
prone to MASS.

SQ6.

Does traditional
piracy
attacks
will affect MASS,
even
though
there is no crew
onboard.

SQ7.

Cyber-attacks
will be more on
MASS and is
considered to be
more vulnerable
to this threat,
including cyber
piracy.
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SQ8.

SQ9.

Does
pirates
hijack
MASS
(physically
or
through cyberattack) to ask for
money for cargo,
launch attacks
on
vulnerable
assets or port
installations,
collision
with
warships/comme
rcial
ships,
grounding
in
navigable areas
also highlighted
in
the given
scenarios.
There is any
possibility
of
exploitation
of
Global
Navigation
Surveillance
System (GNSS)
or
Automatic
Identification
System
(AIS)
data along with
other
digital
systems
and
software’s
onboard MASS
(bridge systems,
cargo handling
and
management
systems,
machinery and
propulsion
systems, control
systems,
passenger
servicing
and
management
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SQ10.

SQ11.

SQ12.

systems,
passenger public
networks, crew
welfare systems,
and
communication
systems)
Does non-state
actors use MASS
as a weapon to
attack sensitive
installations/
places/ assets of
any
country
(warships, port or
coastline
installations etc.
see both the
scenarios
outcome)
Cyber security
threat
considered
as
higher than the
physical attack
by pirates on
MASS

There is a risk
that
crewless
MASS may also
pose threat to the
security of other
conventional
ships at sea or
harbor.
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SQ13.

There are high
possibilities
of
MASS
being
hijacked
and
used by criminals
for international
organized
crimes.

SQ14.

The
ship’s
security may be
weakened
on
crewless MASS
under the ISPS
code.

SQ15.

Shore
Control
Centers (SCC)
on land are more
vulnerable
to
cyber-attacks
which includes
the
Communication
and networking
infrastructure of
MASS
(See
Scenario II).
Shore
Control
Centers (SCC)
may came under
attack by the
Non-state actors
and use MASS
as a weapon
against sensitive
targets
(See
Scenario II).

SQ16.
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SQ17.

SQ18.

SQ19.

SQ20.

Law
Enforcement
Agencies
are
capable
to
handle situations
after
physical
and cyber-attack
has been done
on MASS/ SCC
as mentioned in
the given two
scenarios
The employment
of MASS may
present
new
challenges
for
maritime
law
enforcement
organizations
(such as Coast
Guard,
Navy,
Police, Maritime
Security Agency)
The acceptance
of
MASS
in
shipping industry
will considerably
influence
law
enforcement
agencies use of
Visit
Board
Search
and
Seizure (VBSS)
Inspection
of
MASS at sea
along
with
document
verification
during
VBSS
may
require
alternate
measures/arrang
ements
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SQ21.

VBSS operation
onboard
crewless MASS
may
cause
challenge
for
Law
Enforcement
Agencies.

SQ22.

Is there any
requirement for
possible change
in
maritime
interdiction/
boarding (VBSS)
procedures
involving MASS

SQ23.

Enhancement of
maritime security
in MASS era is
unavoidable
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